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symmetric preferences. Both conditions require that when circumstances
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agent. The second, replacement-domination, applies to changes in the
preferences of one agent. Unfortunately, no Pareto-eﬃcient solution sat-
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1 Introduction
We study the problem of choosing a location for a facility or a public good on a
set of locations topologically equivalent to a cycle, on the basis of the preferences
of agents over such locations. We assume that each agent has cyclically single-
peaked (and hence single-troughed) preferences. This means here that she has a
preferred location; moving the good away from this location in either direction
makes her worse oﬀ. Due to the structure of the cycle, she also has a worse
location; moving the good away from this location in either direction makes her
better oﬀ. We also assume that preferences are symmetric.
A spatial example of this problem is the choice of the location of a geosta-
tionary satellite above the equator. Each satellite user has a preferred location
for the satellite and the farther from this point the satellite is located, the worse
oﬀ she is. Here is now a temporal example. Suppose that the government has to
accomplish some task on a yearly basis, for example collecting taxes. Each in-
habitant of the country has preferences over dates in the year for this to happen.
Some prefer it to happen during the summer, while they are on vacation, others
might prefer it to happen in January, when they are planning their budget for
the year. Each has a preferred date and the closer the decided date is from his
preferred date, the better oﬀ he is.
We wish to identify desirable location or date choice rules. First, it should
not be possible to make all agents better oﬀ, and at least one of them strictly
better oﬀ by replacing the chosen location or date by another one. This is
the “Pareto-eﬃciency” requirement. Next, we consider independently two con-
ditions of solidarity among agents when their circumstances change. These
conditions ensure that changes aﬀect everyone not responsible for these changes
in the same direction. The ﬁrst one applies to situations where the population
of the economy is variable. Introduced by Thomson (1983a, 1983b) in the con-
text of bargaining, “population-monotonicity” requires that when new agents
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arrive or when some agents leave, all the agents present at the beginning and
at the end should be aﬀected in the same direction. The second condition,
“replacement-domination”, applies to situations where the population of the
economy is ﬁxed. The changes in the environment are changes in preferences of
the agents. It requires that if the preferences of one agent change, all the others
should be aﬀected in the same way: either all gain or all lose. Replacement-
domination was introduced by Moulin (1987) in the context of binary public
decision-making. Both conditions were extensively studied in bargaining theory,
coalitional games, social choice theory and the theory of resource allocation.1
The axiomatic analysis of the choice of a location from a location set was ﬁrst
analyzed on a line. This study was later extended to more complex locations
sets like trees, cycles or graphs containing at least one cycle. Pareto-eﬃciency is
usually not restrictive in this class of problems. For example, when the location
set is a line interval, over which agents have single-peaked preferences, the
Pareto set is the entire segment of locations comprised between the two most
extreme peaks. This motivated the study of Pareto-eﬃciency in conjunction
with other axioms.
A ﬁrst path was explored by Moulin (1980). He looked for strategy-proof
rules, which give agents incentives to truthfully reveal their preferences. He
considered the case where the location set is a line interval. Schummer and
Vohra (2000) extended this work to the case of trees and graphs containing
cycles. On cycles, Schummer and Vohra (2000) obtained a negative result: only
dictatorial rules satisfy strategy-proofness and Pareto-eﬃciency.
A second approach, pioneered by Thomson (1993) and Ching and Thom-
son (1999) focuses on solidarity criteria. Like Moulin, they consider the case
where the location set is a line interval. Thomson (1993) studied replacement-
domination. Ching and Thomson (1999) studied population-monotonicity. Both
1For a survey on population-monotonicity, see Thomson (1999b). For a survey on
replacement-domination, see Thomson (1999a).
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Thomson (1993) and Ching and Thomson (1997) characterized the following
class of rules on the basis of Pareto-eﬃciency and solidarity. Let a be a ﬁxed
point in the line interval. Whenever a is located in the Pareto set, choose this
point. Whenever it is not, choose the peak that is the closest to a. This deﬁnes
a family of ”target” rules parameterized by a. Vohra (1998) and Klaus (2002)
extended these results to trees, and proved analogous characterizations in this
case. The case of cycles (and graphs containing at least one cycle) was left
open.2
Unfortunately, when the location set is a cycle, no Pareto-eﬃcient solu-
tion satisﬁes any of the two solidarity conditions, as we show in Section 3.
The cyclic structure of the preferences and the richness of the domain render
Pareto-eﬃciency and solidarity incompatible. Are these conditions compatible
on a smaller domains of cyclically single-peaked preferences? We show that they
are, when the domain is suﬃciently small. In Section 4, we introduce a class of
restricted ﬁnite domains of cyclically single-peaked preferences. Each of these
domains is obtained by restricting agent’s preferred points to lie on a regular
polygon inscribed in the circle. We characterize the set of solutions on poly-
gons with three, four and ﬁve vertices. Each of the solutions satisfying Pareto-
eﬃciency and solidarity has the following interesting feature: it maximizes a
certain weak partial order on the Pareto-set. On the hexagon and any higher
order regular polygon, we obtain an impossibility. Therefore Pareto-eﬃciency
and solidarity are compatible only on small domains of cyclically single-peaked
preferences.
2Another ramiﬁcation of this literature was initiated by Miyagawa (1998, 2001) and Ehlers
(2002, 2003) who both considered the location of multiple goods on a line. In the location prob-
lem of two goods, they obtained diﬀerent characterizations of Pareto-eﬃcient and population-
monotonic rules corresponding to diﬀerent preferences over pairs of locations. Ehlers and
Klaus (2001) consider lotteries of locations on an interval. Gordon (2006) studies a model of
“public decision”, which generalizes all models of location choice, and derives general impli-
cations of solidarity conditions.
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2 The Model
The choice of the location of a facility on a location set topologically equivalent
to a circle has to be made. In order to keep matters simple and with no loss
of generality, let the location set3 be a circle C in the Euclidean space R2. Let
d (., .) be the distance along the circle. For all x ∈ C, let σ (x) be the location
on C diametrally opposed to x, i.e. the location y that maximizes d (x, y).
Let N be the set of nonnegative integers. Each integer represents an agent.
A population is a non-empty and ﬁnite subset M ⊂ N . A preference R on
C is a binary relation, that is reﬂexive, transitive and complete. Let R be
the set of all cyclically single-peaked and symmetric preferences. Each such
preference R ∈ R has a preferred location p (R) . For all x, y ∈ C, let x R y
iﬀ d (x, p (R)) ≤ d (y, p (R)) . Therefore the worst location for preference R is
σ (p (R)). Let P be the strict preference relation, and I be the indiﬀerence
relation associated with preference R.
Within a population M , each agent i ∈ M is equipped with a preference
relation Ri ∈ R. A preference proﬁle for population M is a list RM = (Ri)i∈M .
Let RM be the set of preference proﬁles for population M . More generally, a
preference proﬁle is a list RM for some population M. It is therefore an element
of the union of all RM , over all populations M . Let U be this union. For all two
by two disjoint populations M1, ...,Mk, the notation (RM1 , . . . , RMk) designates
the proﬁle for the population M1 ∪ . . . ∪ Mk, such that, for all j = 1, . . . , k,
agents in Mj have preferences as in the proﬁle RMj .
For all RM ∈ U , all pair of locations x, y ∈ C, the location x weakly-Pareto-
dominates y for RM if, for all i ∈ M, we have x Ri y. This is denoted by x
RM y. Similarly, x is Pareto-indiﬀerent to y for RM if, for all i ∈ M, we have
3The speciﬁc geometric shape of the location set does not play any role. With a diﬀerent
geometric shape, the problem is homeomorphic to the one we consider and all the results
apply.
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x Ii y. This is denoted by x IM y. For all RM ∈ U , a location x ∈ C is Pareto-
eﬃcient for RM if no other location in C weakly-Pareto-dominates x and is
strictly preferred by at least one agent in M , i.e. if there is no y ∈ C such that
y RM x and y Pi x for some i ∈ M . Let E (RM) be the set of Pareto-eﬃcient
locations for RM . As we will argue later, this set if generally a continuum.
This motivates the search for a selection from the Pareto-set that satisﬁes other
desirable conditions.
A solution maps preference proﬁles from a certain subset D of U into C. For
all RM ∈ D, the location selected by the solution for the proﬁle RM is interpreted
as a prescription for the proﬁle RM . A solution on D is Pareto-eﬃcient if for all
RM ∈ D, it selects for RM a location in the Pareto-set E (RM). We are interested
in Pareto-eﬃcient solutions that satisfy in addition a solidarity condition. Such
conditions are deﬁned next.
2.1 Population-monotonicity
In the variable population model, a solution is denoted by Π and its domain is U .
We search for Pareto-eﬃcient solutions Π : U → C satisfying the solidarity re-
quirement of population-monotonicity. This conditions says that when one
agent joins a population, all other agents initially present (whose preferences
are kept ﬁxed), should be aﬀected in the same direction. Solution Π satisﬁes
this condition if, for all RM ∈ U , all i ∈ N \N, and all R′i ∈ R, we have, either
Π (R′i, RM) RM Π(RM) , or Π (RM) RM Π(R
′
i, RM). Together with Pareto-
eﬃciency, population-monotonicity implies4 a stronger property, population-
monotonicity+. This conditions says that when a group of agents joins a pop-
ulation, all other agents initially present (whose preferences are kept ﬁxed),
should weakly lose. A solution satisﬁes this condition if, for all RM , R
′
L ∈ U ,
4This result is standard in the literature. See for example Ehlers and Klaus (2001) or
Gordon (2006).
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such that L ∩M = ∅, we have Π (RM) RM Π(R′L, RM).
2.2 Replacement-domination
In the ﬁxed population model, let N be the ﬁxed population consisting of the
n ≥ 3 agents with labels 0, ..., n− 1. A solution is denoted by Φ and its domain
is RN . We search for Pareto-eﬃcient solutions Φ : RN → C satisfying the
solidarity requirement of replacement-domination. This condition says that
if the preferences of one agent change, all the other agents (whose preferences
are kept ﬁxed) should be aﬀected in the same direction. Solution Φ satisﬁes
this condition if, for all i ∈ N, for all RN\{i} ∈ RN\{i}, and for all Ri, R′i ∈ R,
we have, either Φ
(
R′i, RN\{i}
)
RN\{i} Φ
(
Ri, RN\{i}
)
, or Φ
(
Ri, RN\{i}
)
RN\{i}
Φ
(
R′i, RN\{i}
)
.
3 Full domain
In this section, we describe the structure of the Pareto-set for any proﬁle
in U , and present negative results. No Pareto-eﬃcient solution on U sat-
isﬁes population-monotonicity. No Pareto-eﬃcient solution on RN satisﬁes
replacement-domination.
We ﬁrst introduce the following deﬁnitions. An arch is a connected subset
of C. For all x = y ∈ C2, the closed arch [x, y] is the set of locations including x
and y, that are reached as we travel counter-clockwise between x and y. Deﬁne
similarly (with the appropriate modiﬁcations) the open arch ]x, y[ , and the
semi-open arches [x, y[ and ]x, y] . For all x = y ∈ C2, we have [x, y] ∪ ]y, x[ =
[x, y[∪ [y, x[ = ]x, y]∪ ]y, x] = C. By convention, let [x, x] := {x}. For all x ∈ C,
let Rx ∈ R be the unique preference such that p (Rx) = x. For all RM ∈ U , let
S(RM) be the set {Ri : i ∈ M}.
In order to characterize the Pareto-set, we introduce a taxonomy of proﬁles
in U . First, proﬁles in L (as in “large”) are the ones with the highest preference
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heterogeneity. Let RM ∈ L if it is not possible to ﬁnd a single half-circle
containing all peaks in the proﬁle, i.e. either there are x, y, z such that y ∈
]x, σ (x)[, z ∈ ]σ (x) , x[, {Rx, Ry, Rz} ⊆ S (RM) , and either Rσ(x) ∈ S (RM) or
z ∈ ]y, σ (y)[. Second, proﬁles in P (as in “polar”) are the ones with polarized
preferences. Let RM ∈ P if exactly two preferences are represented in the proﬁle,
one the opposite of the other, i.e. there is x ∈ C such that S (RM) =
{
Rx, Rσ(x)
}
.
Third, proﬁles in I (as in “interval”) are the ones with the lowest heterogeneity
of preferences. Let RM ∈ I if there are x, z ∈ C, such that z ∈ [x, σ (x)] ,
Rx, Rz ∈ S (RM) ⊆ {Ry : y ∈ [x, z]}and S (RM) 
{
Rx, Rσ(x)
}
. For all such
proﬁle RM , there is at most one such pair (x, z). In particular, the class I
contains the subclass of unanimous proﬁles, such that all agents in the proﬁle
share the same preference. Clearly, L,P and I partition U . The following result
motivates the above proﬁle taxonomy.
Lemma 1 For all RM ∈ L∪P, we have E (RM) = C. For all RM ∈ I, let (x, z)
be the unique pair of locations such that z ∈ [x, σ (x)] , and Rx, Rz ∈ S (RM) ⊆
{Ry : y ∈ [x, z]} . Then E (RM) = [x, z].
Proof. For proﬁles in I, the result is simply analogous to the case where
the location set is a line. It is therefore the interval delimited by the most
extreme peaks in the proﬁle, i.e. the interval [x, z] where x and z are as in the
deﬁnition above. For any proﬁle in P , all locations are Pareto-eﬃcient since
the two polar preferences in the proﬁle are each the opposite of the other. For
any proﬁle RM in L, and any location x in C, we can ﬁnd a subpopulation
{i, j} ⊆ M such that the proﬁle (Ri, Rj) is an element of I, and x is an element
of E(Ri, Rj) = [p(Ri), p(Rj)]. Then no other location even weakly Pareto-
dominates x for (Ri, Rj). As a consequence, x ∈ E(RM). Therefore E(RM) = C
in this case as well.
The Pareto set is therefore a continuum, except for unanimous proﬁles.
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This motivates the search for Pareto-eﬃcient solutions satisfying solidarity con-
ditions. Unfortunately, none exists, as we show next. This result contrasts
with the positive results obtained by Thomson (1993) and Ching and Thomson
(1997), when the location set is a line. The proof of this result is deferred to
the end of the paper, since it is an implication of a stronger result (Theorem 6).
Theorem 1 No solution on U satisﬁes Pareto-eﬃciency and population-monotonicity.
Let N ∈ N such that |N |  4. No solution on RN satisﬁes Pareto-eﬃciency
and replacement-domination.
The following lesson can be drawn from this disappointing result. Solidarity
and Pareto-eﬃciency are incompatible in a suﬃciently rich domain of cyclically
singe-peaked preferences (in this case, when all such preferences are admissible).
However, as we will show next, these axioms are compatible in smaller domains.
How small must a domain be for Pareto-eﬃciency and solidarity to be compat-
ible? Which solutions satisfy these conditions on small domains? Section 4
provides a detailed answer to these two questions.
We end this section by stating a useful property of the Pareto set in this
model, which follows directly from the previous deﬁnitions. The Pareto set can
always be generated by a small sub-proﬁle.
Lemma 2 For all RM ∈ U , there exists a subpopulation L ⊆ M such that
|L| ≤ 4 and E (RL) = E (RM) . When RM ∈ P ∪ I, this subpopulation can be
chosen such that |L| ≤ 2.
4 Polygon-structured preferences
We introduce a family Rv of discrete subsets of R indexed by v ∈ N such that
v ≥ 3. For each such v, let c0, ..., cv−1 (in counterclockwise order) be the v
vertices of a regular polygon inscribed in C. Let Nv be the set 0, ..., v − 1. For
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convenience, for all s ∈ Z, let cs := cr, where r is the unique element of Nv such
that s − r is divisible by v. Equivalently, r is the remainder in the euclidian
division of s by v. For all s ∈ Z, let Rs be the unique preference in R such
that p (Rs) = cs. Let Rv be the set of preferences in R whose peaks are one of
the v vertices, i.e. Rv := {R0, . . . , Rv−1}. Let Uv ⊂ U be the set of proﬁles in
U such that all agents have preferences in Rv. In this section, we show that,
if v is less or equal than ﬁve, then (i) Pareto-eﬃcient solutions restricted to
proﬁles in Uv satisfying population-monotonicity exist, and (ii) Pareto-eﬃcient
solutions restricted to proﬁles in RNv satisfying replacement-domination exist.
We characterize these solutions.5
4.1 The Pareto set
In the particular case where RM ∈ Rv, the previous taxonomy can be simpliﬁed
as follows. For all proﬁle RM , we have RM ∈ L if there are r, s, t ∈ Nv such that
cs ∈ (cr, σ(cr)), ct ∈ (σ(cr), cr), and {Rr, Rs, Rt} ⊆ S (RM), and either (v is even
and Rr+
v
2 ∈ S (RM)) or ct ∈ (cs, σ(cs)). We have RM ∈ P if v is even, and there
is r ∈ Nv such that S (RM) =
{
Rr, Rr+
v
2
}
. Finally, we have RM ∈ I if there are
r, t ∈ Nv, such that ct ∈ [cr, σ(cr)], and Rr, Rt ∈ S (RM) ⊆ {Rs : cs ∈ (cr, ct)}
and RM /∈ P. In this last case, the pair (r, t) is uniquely determined, and from
Lemma 2, we have E (RM) = [cr, ct].
4.2 An implication of population-monotonicity
In Lemma 3, we establish a general implication of Pareto-eﬃciency and population-
monotonicity on the discrete domains Uv. If a solution satisﬁes population-
monotonicity and Pareto-eﬃciency, then its restriction to non-polar proﬁles
only depends on the Pareto-set, and satisﬁes a monotonicity property with re-
5Many of the objects we introduce, such as the locations cs and the preferences Rs, depend
on the parameter v. To alleviate notations, we do not index these objects by v.
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spect to the Pareto-set. Later, we will prove that for v ∈ {3, 4, 5}, solutions
on Uv satisfying these conditions exist. For these cases, Lemma 3 describes a
feature common to all such solutions. But we will also prove that, for v > 5,
no solution on Uv satisﬁes these conditions. For these cases, Lemma 3 is a step
towards the impossibility result.
Lemma 3 Suppose that there exists a solution on Uv satisfying Pareto-eﬃciency
and population-monotonicity, and let Π be such a solution. Let RN , R
′
M ∈ Uv\P
such that Π(RN) ∈ E (R′M) ⊆ E (RN). Then Π(R′M) = Π (RN).
Proof. Let L be a population such that L ∩M = L ∩ N = ∅, and let R′′L ∈
Uv \ P such that S (R′′L) = S (R′M) . In particular, R′′L and R′M deﬁne the same
weak Pareto-domination relation, and we have E (R′′L) = E (R
′
M) ⊆ E (RN) .
Let xN := Π (RN) , xM := Π (R
′
M), xL := Π (R
′′
L) , xML := Π (R
′
M , R
′′
L) and
xNL := Π (RN , R
′′
L) . By population-monotonicity+, we have xM R
′
M xML. Since
xML ∈ E (R′M , R′′L) = E (R′M) , we have xM I ′M xML. Since R′M /∈ P , this implies
in fact xM = xML. By a similar argument, we have xML = xL. Therefore
xM = xL. By population-monotonicity+, we have xN RN xNL. Since xNL ∈
E (RN , R
′′
L) = E (RN) , we have in fact xN IN xNL. Since RN /∈ P, this implies
xN = xNL. By population-monotonicity+, we have xL R
′′
L xNL. Since xNL = xN
and xL = xM , we then have xM R
′′
L xN . Since R
′
M and R
′′
L deﬁne the same
relation, this implies xM R
′
M xN . But since xN ∈ E (R′M) , we then obtain xM
I ′M xN . Since R
′
M /∈ P , this implies xM = xN .
4.3 Implications of replacement-domination
In Lemma 4 and Theorem 2, we establish general implications of Pareto-eﬃciency
and replacement-domination on the discrete domains RNv . In Lemma 4, we
show in essence that if a solution satisﬁes these conditions, then its restriction
to non-polar proﬁles only depends on the Pareto-set. In Theorem 2, we show
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that replacement-domination is at least as strong a requirement as population-
monotonicity, in the sense that any solution that satisﬁes Pareto-eﬃciency and
replacement-domination on RNv can be extended to a solution on Uv satisfy-
ing Pareto-eﬃciency and population-monotonicity. Later, we will prove that
for v ∈ {3, 4, 5}, solutions on RNv satisfying Pareto-eﬃciency and replacement-
domination exist. For these cases, Lemma 4 and Theorem 2 describe common
features of all such solutions. But we will also prove that for v > 5, no solution
on RNv satisﬁes these conditions. For these cases, Lemma 4 and Theorem 2 are
steps towards the impossibility result.
Recall that N is a ﬁxed population, such that |N | ≥ 4. In Lemma 4, we
use the following notation. For all r, s ∈ Z, let Rr∗sN := (Rr, Rs, ..., Rs) . Also
let xr∗s := Φ (Rr∗sN ). For all s ∈ Z and all x ∈ C, let σs(x) := x if x = cs, and
let σs(x) be the unique location in C distinct from x that is indiﬀerent to x for
preference Rs.
Lemma 4 Suppose that there exists a solution on RNv that satisﬁes Pareto-
eﬃciency and replacement-domination, and let Φ be such a solution. (i) For
all RN ∈ I, let (r, s) be the unique indices such that E (RN) = [cr, cs] . If
cs = σ(cr), we have Φ (RN) = xr∗s. (ii) There exists x∗Φ ∈ C such that, for all
RN ∈ L, we have Φ (RN) = x∗Φ, for all RN ∈ P, we have Φ (RN) IN x∗Φ, and
for all s ∈ Z, and for all proﬁle RN ∈ RNv such that E (RN) = [cs, σ(cs)] , we
have Φ (RN) = x
∗
Φ if x
∗
Φ ∈ E (RN) and Φ (RN) = σs (x∗Φ) otherwise.
Proof. We will prove (i) and (ii), after two preliminary steps.
Step 0 (reduction): Let RN ∈ RNv . Let L ⊂ N be nonempty. Suppose that
for all M such that L ⊆ M ⊆ N, we have E (RM) ⊆ E (RL) . Let R′N be such
that R′L = RL and S (R
′
N) = S (RL) . Then Φ (RN) IL Φ (R
′
N) . If, in addition,
R′N /∈ P , then Φ (RN) = Φ (R′N) .
Proof of Step 0: Let i (1) , ..., i (K) denote the agents in N\L. Consider the se-
quence of proﬁles such that R0N := RN and proﬁle R
k
N is identical to proﬁle
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Rk−1N , except for agent i (k) , whose preference is replaced with R
′
i(k), so that
RkN :=
(
Rk−1N\{i(k)}, R
′
i(k)
)
. Clearly RKN = R
′
N . Along the transformation path,
the preferences of agents in L remain ﬁxed at RL. We have Φ
(
RkN
) ∈ E (RkN
) ⊆
E (RL) , by Pareto-eﬃciency of Φ and the assumption on the Pareto-sets. This
and replacement-domination for the ﬁxed subproﬁle RL imply that the entire
sequence
{
Φ
(
RkN
)}n−3
0
lies in a single indiﬀerence curve for each preference in
the proﬁle RL. Therefore Φ (RN) IL Φ (R
′
N) . If, in addition, R
′
N /∈ P , we obtain
further Φ (RN) = Φ (R
′
N) .
Step 1: Suppose that Rr, Rs ∈ S (RN) and for all M ⊆ N, we have E (RM) ⊆
E (Rr, Rs) . Then Φ (RN) I
r∗s
N xr∗s.
Proof of Step 1: The result is trivially satisﬁed if r = s, so let us assume r = s.
Let i such that Ri = R
r, and j such that Rj = R
s. Let l = i, j. Let R′l := R1. Let
R′N :=
(
RN\{l}, R′l
)
. Let R′′N :=
(
R′N\{l}, R
r
)
. By replacement-domination, ap-
plied to agents i and j, we have Φ (R′N) I
r∗s
N Φ (RN) . By replacement-domination,
applied to agents in {i, j, l} \ {1} , we have Φ (R′′N) Ir∗sN Φ (R′N) . If j = 1, let
g := j, otherwise let g := l. In both cases g = 1 and R′′g = Rs. By Step 0 applied
to L := {1, g} and R′ := Rr∗sN , we have Φ (R′′N) Ir∗sN xr∗s.
Proof of (i). Apply Step 1 in the special case, where cs = σ(cr).The result is
trivially satisﬁed if r = s, so let us assume r = s. In this case, Φ (R′′N) Ir∗sN xr∗s
implies Φ (R′′N) = xr∗s.
Proof of (ii). We distinguish two cases, depending on whether v is odd or
even.
Case 1. v ≥ 3 is odd. In this case, there are no proﬁles in P , so it suﬃces to
prove the claim for proﬁles in L. Let η := v−1
2
. Let x∗Φ := Φ (R
0, Rη, Rη+1, ..., Rη+1) .
Let RN ∈ L. We will show that Φ (RN) = x∗Φ. We now deﬁne a sequence{
R∗kN
}
k=0,...,6
of proﬁles, a sequence {i (k)}k=1,...,6 of agents, and a sequence{
R∗ki(k)
}
k=1,...,6
of “replacement preferences”. Let R∗0N := RN and or all k =
1, ..., n, let R∗kN be the proﬁle obtained from R
∗k−1
N by replacing the preference
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of agent i (k) with the preference R∗ki(k), so that R
∗k
N :=
(
R∗k−1N\{i(k)}, R
∗k
i(k)
)
. Let
R∗1i(1) := R
∗0
1 , R
∗2
i(2) := R
0, R∗3i(3) := R
∗2
2 , R
∗4
i(4) := R
η, R∗5i(5) := R
∗4
3 , R
∗6
i(6) := R
η+1.
Let j (0) , l (0) ∈ N\ {1} distinct such that
(
R∗01 , R
∗0
j(0), R
∗0
l(0)
)
∈ L. Let i (1) /∈
{1, j (0) , l (0)} . Let i (2) := 1. Let j (2) , l (2) ∈ N be such that
(
R0, R∗2j(2), R
∗2
l(2)
)
∈
L. Let i (3) /∈ {1, j (2) , l (2)} . Let j (3) , l (3) be two distinct elements of the
set {j (2) , l (2) , i (3)} \ {2}. Let i (4) := 2. Let l (4) ∈ {j (3) , l (3)} \ {2} .
Let i (5) /∈ {1, 2, l (4)} . Let l (5) ∈ {l (4) , i (5)} \ {3} . Let i (6) := 3. Let
j (1) := j (0) , j (4) := 2, j (4) := 2, l (1) := l (0) . Finally, let g (k) := 1 for
all k = 1 and let g (1) := i (1) . By construction, for each k, R∗k{g(k),j(k),l(k)} ∈ L.
Comparing proﬁle R∗kN and R
∗k+1
N , the peak of agents g (k) , j (k) and l (k) are
kept ﬁxed. By replacement-domination, agents g (k) , j (k) and l (k) are all
three aﬀected in the same direction. Since R∗k{g(k),j(k),l(k)} ∈ L, this implies
that Φ
(
R∗kN
)
= Φ
(
R∗k+1N
)
. Therefore the sequence
{
Φ
(
R∗kN
)}6
0
is constant.
In particular Φ (R∗0N ) = Φ (R
∗6
N ) . Since (R
∗6
1 , R
∗6
2 , R
∗6
3 ) ∈ L, we also have by
Step 0, Φ (R∗6N ) = Φ (R
0, Rη, Rη+1, ..., Rη+1) = x∗Φ. Since R
∗0
N = RN , we obtain
Φ (RN) = x
∗
Φ.
Case 2. v ≥ 4 is even. Throughout the rest of the proof, let xr := xr∗r+v/2, for
all r. For all list r1, ..., rm, let I (r1, ..., rm) := {x ∈ C : x Ir1 xr1 , ..., x Irm xrm} .
The proof is in a number of steps. Step a: Let RN be any proﬁle, such that
there exists r such that that Rr, Rr+
v
2 ∈ S (RN) . Clearly for all M ⊆ N,
we have E (RM) ⊆ C = E
(
Rr, Rr+
v
2
)
. Therefore by Step 1, we have Φ (RN)
Ir∗r+v/2 xr, that is Φ (RN) Ir xr holds for any such proﬁle RN . Step b: Let
RN be any proﬁle such that there are i, j, k ∈ N satisfying R{i,j,k} ∈ L. Let
r be such that Ri = R
r. Let u = i, j, k. Let R′N :=
(
RN\{u}, R
r+v/2
u
)
. By
replacement-domination, we have Φ (RN) I
r Φ (R′N). Since R
′
N satisﬁes the as-
sumptions of Step a, we have Φ (R′N) I
r xr. Therefore Φ (RN) I
r xr holds for
any such proﬁle RN . Step c: For all r, the set I (r, r + 1) contains at most one el-
ement. Step d: Let v = 4. By step b, we have Φ (Rr−1, Rr+1, Rr+ v2 , . . . , Rr+ v2 ) ∈
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I
(
r − 1, r + 1, r + v
2
)
. Since Ir = Ir+
v
2 and, by Step a, xr+ v
2
Ir xr it then fol-
lows that Φ
(
Rr−1, Rr+1, Rr+
v
2 , . . . , Rr+
v
2
) ∈ I (r − 1, r + 1, r + v
2
)
. This proves
that for all r, the set I (r − 1, r, r + 1) is nonempty. By step c, it contains
at most one element, therefore it contains exactly one element. Thus for all
r, both sets I (r − 1, r) and I (r, r + 1) , which contain I (r − 1, r, r + 1) , are
nonempty. By step c, both sets contain a unique element and are equal. Step e:
If v = 4, the set I (0, 1) contains at least Φ (R0, R1, R2, R3, ..., R3) , by Step
a, and contains only this element, by step c. If v = 4, it immediately fol-
lows from Step d that the set I (0, ..., v − 1) is a singleton set. Therefore,
in all cases, this set contains a unique element. Let x∗Φ be this unique el-
ement. We now verify that x∗Φ satisﬁes all the desired properties. Step f:
Let RN ∈ P . Step a ensures that Φ (RN) IN x∗Φ. Step g: Let RN ∈ I such
that E (RN) =
[
cr, cr+ v
2
]
. Again Step a ensures that Φ (RN) I
r x∗Φ. This
and Φ (RN) ∈
[
cr, cr+ v
2
]
(i.e. Pareto-eﬃciency) imply that Φ (RN) = x
∗
Φ if
x∗Φ ∈ E (RN) and Φ (RN) = σ (x∗Φ) otherwise. Step h: Finally, let RN ∈ L. Ei-
ther there are r, s such that s /∈ {r, r + v
2
}
and S (RN) =
{
Rr, Rs, Rr+
v
2 , Rs+
v
2
}
,
or there are r, s, t such that {Rr, Rs, Rt} ⊆ S (RN) and (Rr, Rs, Rt) ∈ L. In
the ﬁrst case, Step a implies that Φ (RN) ∈ I (r, s). Since s /∈
{
r, r + v
2
}
, this
implies Φ (RN) = x
∗
Φ. In the second case, by Step b, Φ (RN) ∈ I (r, s, t) . Again,
since (Rr, Rs, Rt) ∈ L, this implies that Φ (RN) = x∗Φ.
The following deﬁnition plays a role in the next result and later in the paper.
We say that two solutions with the same domain are Pareto-equivalent if, for
all proﬁle RM in the domain, the locations selected by each of these two solutions
for proﬁle RM are Pareto-indiﬀerent for RM .
Theorem 2 Let Φ be a solution on RNv that satisﬁes Pareto-eﬃciency and
replacement-domination. There exists a solution Π on Uv that satisﬁes population-
monotonicity6 and coincides with Φ on RNv .
6The construction of Π further ensures that for all population M, the restriction of Π to
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Proof. Deﬁne a solution Γ as follows. Let x∗Φ as deﬁned in Lemma 4. For
all RM ∈ L ∪ P, let Γ (RM) := x∗Φ. For all RM such that E (RM) = [cr, cs] ,
let Γ (RM) := Φ (R
r, Rr+1, Rs, ..., Rs) . Let us verify that Γ satisﬁes population-
monotonicity. We distinguish three cases. Let RM ∈ RNv and i /∈ M, R′i ∈ Rv.
Case 1. E (R′i, RM) = E (RM) . Then Γ (R
′
i, RM) = Γ (RM) and population-
monotonicity is satisﬁed. Case 2. v is even and Ri /∈ S (RM) =
{
Rr, Rr+
v
2
}
.
Then E (R′i, RM) equals either
[
cr, cr+ v
2
]
or
[
cr+ v
2
, cr
]
. Therefore Γ (R′i, RM) is
either equal to Φ
(
Rr, Rr+1, Rr+
v
2 , ..., Rr+
v
2
)
or to Φ
(
Rr+
v
2 , Rr+
v
2
+1, Rr, ..., Rr
)
.
By Lemma 4, in both cases, Γ (R′i, RM) I
r,r+ v
2 x∗Φ. Since Γ (RM) = x
∗
Φ, we
obtain Γ (R′i, RM) I
r,r+ v
2 Γ (RM) , i.e. Γ (R
′
i, RM) IM Γ (RM) and population-
monotonicity is satisﬁed. Case 3. E (RM) = [cr, cs] . Let x := Φ (R
r∗s
N ) , R
′′
n :=
R′i and y := Φ
(
Rr∗sN\{n}, R
′′
n
)
. By replacement-domination, we have x Rr y and
x Rs y. These relations imply that for all t such that ct ∈ [cr, cs] , we have x Rt
y. Since Γ (RM) = x and Γ (RM , R
′
i) = y, we obtain that for all such t, we have
Γ (RM) R
t Γ (RM , R
′
i) . Since S (RM) ⊆ {Rt : ct ∈ [cr, cs]} , this implies Γ (RM)
RM Γ (RM , R
′
i) . Thus population-monotonicity is satisﬁed. Therefore Γ satisﬁes
population-monotonicity on Uv. By construction, the restriction of Γ to RNv is
Pareto-indiﬀerent to Φ. Let Π be the solution such that Π (RN) := Φ (RN) on
RNv and Π (RM) := Γ (RM) for all RM ∈ Uv such that M = N . Clearly Π
satisﬁes the desired properties.
4.4 Characterization results
For values v in {3, 4, 5}, solutions satisfying Pareto-eﬃciency and solidarity
exist. We will show that they are all “priority rules”, which we introduce next.
Throughout Sections 4.4 and 4.5, given a solution Π that satisﬁes Pareto-
eﬃciency and population-monotonicity, we will use the following notation. For
all population M , let R∗vM be the proﬁle such that for all i ∈ M, agent i has the
RMv also satisﬁes replacement-domination.
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preference R∗vi = R
i ∈ Rv. 7
4.4.1 Eﬃcient priority rules
An eﬃcient priority rule selects locations according to a priority ordering over
locations, under the constraint of Pareto-eﬃciency.
A priority ordering is a binary relation over C, that is transitive, irreﬂexive,
asymmetric, and not necessarily complete, i.e. a strict partial order. Let 
be the corresponding weak partial order such that for all x, y ∈ C, we have
(x  y) ⇐⇒ (x  y) or (x = y) .
A solution Π on Uv is the eﬃcient priority rule associated with the priority
ordering  if, for all RM ∈ Uv, we have Π (RM) ∈ E (R) and for all RM ∈ Uv
and all x ∈ E (RM) , such that x = Π(RM) , we have Π (RM)  x. Let Π be
the priority rule associated with . Similarly, a solution Φ on RNv is the eﬃcient
priority rule associated with the priority ordering  if, for all RN ∈ RNv , we
have Φ (R) ∈ E (RN), and for all RN ∈ RNv and all x ∈ E (RN) , such that
x = Φ(RN) , we have Φ (RN)  x. Let Φ be the priority rule associated with
. The following conditions (1) and (2) on  and v ensure that the maximum
of  is always unique on the Pareto-set of any preference proﬁle in U . They are
therefore suﬃcient for either Π or Φ to be well-deﬁned.
Condition (1) For all y ∈ C, the set {z ∈ C : z  y} is ﬁnite.
Condition (2) For all RM ∈ Uv (respectively RNv ), and all y = z ∈ E(RM),
either y  z, or z  y, or there exists x ∈ E(RM) such that x  y and
x  z.
Well-deﬁned eﬃcient priority rules are obviously Pareto-eﬃcient. They do
not necessarily satisfy solidarity conditions. However, the rest of the analysis
demonstrates that Pareto-eﬃcient solutions that satisfy a solidarity condition
7For example, R∗5{1,4} is such that R
∗5
1 = R
1 ∈ R5 and R∗54 = R4 ∈ R5.
17
are necessarily eﬃcient priority rules. Moreover, solidarity imposes constraints
on the relative position of the locations with highest priorities.
4.4.2 The case v = 3
When v = 3, all solutions that satisfy Pareto-eﬃciency and either population-
monotonicity or replacement-domination are eﬃcient priority rules. Moreover,
the same three-dimensional family of priorities characterize the solutions to
both problems. A solution in this family is identiﬁed with a parameter δ =
(x, y, z) ∈ C3, that satisﬁes, for some s ∈ {0, 1, 2}, the relations x ∈ [cs, cs+1[,
y ∈ [cs+1, cs+2], z ∈ [cs+2, cs] , y Rs+1 x and z Rs x. Let Δ ⊆ C3 be the set
of such triples. For all δ ∈ Δ, let δ such that, for all u ∈ C\ {x, y, z} , we
have x δ y δ u and x x z δ u. Let Πδ (R) be the priority rule on U3
associated with the priority δ, and let Φδ (R) be the eﬃcient priority rule on
RN3 associated with δ.
For example (see Figure 1), let δ be a vector in Δ such that s = 2. The
rule Πδ selects a location as follows. Let RM be any proﬁle in U3. If x is an
element of E (RM), then the rule selects the location x. In the opposite case,
at most one location among y and z belongs to E (RM). If one among these
two locations does and x does not, then the rule selects this location. Finally, if
none of these three locations belong to E (RM), then RM must be a unanimous
proﬁle. If this is the case, the rule Πx selects the location commonly preferred
by all agents in proﬁle RM .
Theorem 3 (i) A solution on U3 satisﬁes Pareto-eﬃciency and population-
monotonicity iﬀ it is in {Πδ}δ∈Δ. (ii) A solution on RN3 satisﬁes Pareto-
eﬃciency and replacement-domination iﬀ it is in {Φδ}δ∈Δ.
Proof of (i). Πδ is well-deﬁned, since conditions (1) and (2) are clearly satis-
ﬁed, for δ ∈ Δ.
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Figure 1: The case v = 3. A triple δ = (x, y, z) in Δ, such that s = 3.
Πδ satisﬁes population-monotonicity. Let δ ∈ Δ, RM ∈ U5 and R′i ∈ R5. Let
χ := Πδ (RM) and ω := Πδ (R
′
i, RM) . We will show that population-monotonicity
is satisﬁed, i.e. χ RM ω. First, if RM is a unanimous proﬁle, the axiom is trivially
satisﬁed. Suppose through the end of the proof that RM is not unanimous. As
a consequence, (R′i, RM) is not unanimous either. Therefore both χ and ω
are elements of {x, y, z} . Since E (RM) ⊆ E (R′i, RM) , we have ω δ χ. Let us
examine each case. I) Suppose that ω = χ. The axiom is trivially satisﬁed in this
case. II) Suppose that ω = x, χ = y and x = y. Then S (RM) = {Rs+1, Rs+2} .
Since y Rs+1,s+2 x holds, the axiom is satisﬁed. II) Suppose that ω = x, χ = z
and x = z. Then S (RM) = {Rs, Rs+2} . Since z Rs,s+2 x holds, the axiom is
satisﬁed. Since ω δ χ, x δ y, x δ z and χ, ω ∈ {x, y, z} , there are no other
cases, which ends the proof.
If Π satisﬁes Pareto-eﬃciency and population-monotonicity, then Π equals
Πδ for some δ ∈ Δ. Let Π be a solution on U3 satisfying Pareto-eﬃciency and
population-monotonicity. For all population M , let θM := Π (R
∗3
M). Let x :=
θ{0,1,2}. Let s be the unique index in {0, 1, 2} such that x ∈ [cs, cs+1[. Let y :=
θ{s+1,s+2} and z := θ{s+2,s}. By population-monotonicity+, applied to proﬁles
19
R{0,1,2} and R{s+1,s+2}, we have y Rs+1 x. By population-monotonicity+, applied
to proﬁles R{0,1,2} and R{s+2,s}, we have z Rs+1 x. Thus δ := (x, y, z) ∈ Δ.
It remains to show that Π = Πδ. Since v = 3 is odd, there are no proﬁles
in P . Lemma 3 implies that Π (RM) only depends on E (RM) . Let RM ∈ U3
such that x ∈ E (RM) . By Lemma 3 applied to R{0,1,2} and RM , we have
Π (RM) = θ{0,1,2} = x = Πδ (RM) . Let RM ∈ U3 be a non unanimous proﬁle
such that x /∈ E (RM) . Then either E (RM) = [cs+1, cs+2] or E (RM) = [cs+2, cs] .
Suppose that E (RM) = [cs+1, cs+2] . Since Π only depends on the Pareto-set
and E (RM) = E
(
R{s+1,s+2}
)
, we have Π (RM) = θ{s+1,s+2} = y = Πδ (RM) .
Suppose instead E (RM) = [cs+2, cs] . Since Π only depends on the Pareto-set
and E (RM) = E
(
R{s,s+2}
)
, we have Π (RM) = θ{s,s+2} = z = Πδ (RM) . Since
Π and Πδ coincide on any non-unanimous proﬁle, we proved that Π = Πδ.
Proof of (ii). Φδ is well-deﬁned, since conditions (1) and (2) are clearly satis-
ﬁed, for δ ∈ Δ.
Φδ satisﬁes replacement-domination. Let δ ∈ Δ, i ∈ N , L := N\ {i} , RL ∈
RL3 and Ri, R′i ∈ R3. Let ω := Φδ (Ri, RL) and ω′ := Φδ (R′i, RL) . We will
show that replacement-domination is satisﬁed, i.e. either ω RL ω
′, or ω′ RL ω.
Observe that we also have ω = Πδ (Ri, RL) and ω
′ = Πδ (R′i, RL) and that Πδ
satisﬁes population-monotonicity. Let χ := Πδ (RL) . First, if RL is a unanimous
proﬁle, the axiom is trivially satisﬁed. Suppose through the end of the proof
that this is not the case, which also implies that (Ri, RL) and (R
′
i, RL) are not
unanimous either. Therefore ω, ω′, χ ∈ {x, y, z}. Second, if ω = ω′, the axiom
is trivially satisﬁed. Suppose through the end of the proof that ω = ω′. This
implies in particular that at least one location among ω and ω′ diﬀers from
x. Suppose for example that ω = x. We then have ω ∈ {y, z}, which in turn
implies χ = ω. By population-monotonicity, we then have χ RL ω
′, therefore ω
RL ω
′. If instead we suppose ω′ = x, we obtain that ω′ RL ω. In both cases,
the axiom is satisﬁed, which ends the proof.
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If Φ satisﬁes Pareto-eﬃciency and replacement-domination, then Φ equals
Φδ for some δ ∈ Δ. Let Φ be a solution on RN3 satisfying these two conditions.
By Theorem 2, there exist a solution Π on U3 that coincides with Φ on RN3 and
satisﬁes Pareto-eﬃciency and population-monotonicity. By (i), there exists
δ ∈ Δ such that Π = Πδ, which implies that Φ = Φδ, with δ ∈ Δ.
4.4.3 The case v = 4
When v = 4, the solutions satisfying the conditions of Pareto-eﬃciency and
population-monotonicity form a unidimensional family of eﬃcient priority rules.
Only four solutions satisfy Pareto-eﬃciency and replacement-domination. They
are also priority rules, associated with priorities selected from the ﬁrst family.
Let us introduce these families. A priority in the ﬁrst family is identiﬁed
with a parameter x ∈ C. For any such x, let s be the unique index in {0, . . . , 3}
such that x ∈ [cs, cs+1[ . Let x such that x x σs (x) x σ (x) x y and
x x σs+1 (x) x σ (x) x y, for all y ∈ C\ {x, σs (x) , σs+1 (x) , σ (x)} . Let
Πx (RM) be the eﬃcient priority rule on U4 associated with the priority x.
For example (see Figure 2), let x be a location in [c2, c3[. Then s = 2. The
rule Πx selects a location as follows. Let RM be any proﬁle in U4. If x is an
element of E (RM), then the rule selects the location x. In the opposite case,
at most one location among σ2(x) and σ3(x) belongs to E (RM). If one among
these two locations does, then the rule selects this location. If neither x, σ2(x)
nor σ3(x) belong to E (RM), but σ(x) does, then the rule selects the location
σ(x). Finally, if none of these four locations belong to E (RM), then RM must
be a unanimous proﬁle. If this is the case, the rule Πx selects the location
commonly preferred by all agents in proﬁle RM .
A priority in the second family is identiﬁed with an index s ∈ {0, . . . , 3} .
Let s such that for all y ∈ C\ {cs, cs+2}, we have cs s cs+2 s y. Let Φs be
the eﬃcient priority rule on RN5 associated with the priority s . Observe that
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Figure 2: The case v = 4. A location x such that s = 2 and its
symmetric images σ(x), σ2(x) and σ3(x).
s=cs so that Φs is in fact the restriction of Πcs to RN4 .
Theorem 4 (i) A solution on U4 satisﬁes Pareto-eﬃciency and population-
monotonicity iﬀ it is Pareto-equivalent to a solution in {Πx}x∈C. (ii) A solution
on RN4 satisﬁes Pareto-eﬃciency and replacement-domination iﬀ it is Pareto-
equivalent to a solution in {Φ0, . . . ,Φ3} .
Proof of (i). Πx is well-deﬁned. Condition (1) is clearly satisﬁed, for all
x ∈ C. Condition (2) is obviously satisﬁed for all pairs (y, z) that are compa-
rable for the priority x. The only pair that is not necessarily comparable is
(σs (x) , σs+1 (x)) . But for all values of x such that this is the case, the location
x itself is in the Pareto-set for any proﬁle RM such that E (RM) contains them
both. Moreover x has a higher priority rank than both of these locations for the
priority x. Therefore condition (2) holds and Πx is well-deﬁned, for all x ∈ C.
Πx satisﬁes population-monotonicity. We leave it to the reader to verify that
for all x ∈ C, we have σs+1 (x) Rs+2 x, σs+1 (x) Is+1,s+3 x, σs (x) Rs+3 x, σs (x)
Is,s+2 x, σ (x) Rs+2,s+3 σs+1 (x) and σ (x) R
s+2,s+3 σs (x) . Let x ∈ C, RM ∈ U4
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and R′i ∈ R4. Let χ := Πλ (RM) and ω := Πλ (R′i, RM) . We will show that
population-monotonicity is satisﬁed, i.e. χ RM ω. As a starting point, observe
that if either RM is a unanimous proﬁle, or if χ = ω, the axiom is trivially
satisﬁed. Thus we can restrict attention to the remaining cases. Suppose
through the end of the proof that RM is not unanimous, and that χ = ω.
As a consequence, (R′i, RM) is not unanimous either. All remaining cases are
such that either (ω = x and χ ∈ {σs (x) , σs+1 (x)}) or (ω ∈ {σs (x) , σs+1 (x)}
and χ ∈ {σ (x) , x}). Let us examine each case. I) Suppose that (ω = x and
χ = σs+1 (x)). Then S (RM) ⊆ {Rs+1, Rs+2, Rs+3} . Since σs+1 (x) Rs+1,s+2,s+3
x holds, the axiom is satisﬁed. II) Suppose that (ω = x and χ = σs (x)).
Then S (RM) ⊆ {Rs+2, Rs+3, Rs} . Since σs (x) Rs,s+2,s+3 x holds, the axiom
is satisﬁed. III) Suppose that (ω ∈ {σs+1 (x) , σs (x)} and χ = σ (x)). Then
S (RM) = {Rs+2, Rs+3} . Since σ (x) Rs+2,s+3 σs+1 (x) and σ (x) Rs+2,s+3 σs (x)
hold, the axiom is satisﬁed. IV) Suppose that (ω = σs+1 (x) and χ = x). Then
S (RM) = {Rs+1, Rs+3} . Since x Rs+1,s+3 σs+1 (x) holds, the axiom is satisﬁed.
V) Suppose that (ω = σs (x) and χ = x). Then S (RM) = {Rs, Rs+2} . Since
x Rs,s+2 σs (x) holds, the axiom is satisﬁed. We exhausted all possible cases,
which ends the proof.
If Π satisﬁes Pareto-eﬃciency and population-monotonicity, then, for some
x ∈ C, Π is Pareto-equivalent to Πx. Let Π be a solution on U4 satisfying these
two conditions. For all population M , let θM := Π (R
∗4
M). Let x := θ{0,1,2,3}.
Let s be the unique index in {0, . . . , 3} such that x ∈ [cs, cs+1[ . We now verify
that necessarily Π is Pareto-equivalent to Πx. Let RM be a non unanimous pro-
ﬁle. We distinguish several cases. Case 1: Suppose ﬁrst that E (RM) contains
x. Then Lemma 3 ensures that Π (RM) IM x = Πx (RM) . Case 2: Suppose
that E (RM) = [cs+1, cs+3] . Consider proﬁles RM and (RM , R
s
i ) . By population-
monotonicity+, we have Π (RM) R
s+1 Π(RM , R
s
i ) . Since Π (RM , R
s
i ) = x and
Π (RM) ∈ [cs+1, cs+3] , we obtain Π (RM) = σs+1 (x) = Πx (RM) . Case 3:
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Suppose that E (RM) = [cs+2, cs] . Consider proﬁles RM and
(
RM , R
s+1
i
)
. By
population-monotonicity+, we have Π (RM) R
s Π
(
RM , R
s+1
i
)
. Since we have
Π
(
RM , R
s+1
i
)
= x and Π (RM) ∈ [cs+2, cs] , we obtain Π (RM) = σs (x) =
Πx (RM) . Case 4: Suppose that E (RM) = [cs+2, cs+3] . Consider the pro-
ﬁles RM and
(
RM , R
s+1
i
)
. By population-monotonicity+, we have Π (RM) R
s+2
Π
(
RM , R
s+1
i
)
. By Case 2, we have Π
(
RM , R
s+1
i
)
= σs+1 (x) . Therefore Π (RM)
Rs+2 σs+1 (x) . Consider the proﬁles RM and (RM , R
s
i ) . Population-monotonicity+
requires that Π (RM) R
s+3 Π(RM , R
s
i ) . By Case 3, we have Π (RM , R
s
i ) =
σs (x) . Therefore Π (RM) R
s+3 σs (x) . Finally, Π (RM) R
s+2 σs+1 (x) and Π (RM)
Rs+3 σs (x) imply Π (RM) = σ (x) = Πx (RM) . Last, Π and Πx obviously co-
incide on all unanimous proﬁles, therefore we have shown that Π is Pareto-
equivalent to Πx for some x ∈ C.
Proof of (ii). Φs satisﬁes replacement-domination. Let s ∈ {0, ..., 3} . The rule
Φs is obviously well-deﬁned and Pareto-eﬃcient. Let λ ∈ C, i ∈ N , L := N\ {i} ,
RL ∈ RL4 and Ri, R′i ∈ R4. Let ω := Φs (Ri, RL) and ω′ := Φs (R′i, RL) .
Also, let χ := Πcs (RL) . We will show that replacement-domination is satis-
ﬁed, i.e. we either have ω RL ω
′, or ω′ RL ω. First, if RL is a unanimous
proﬁle, then the axiom is trivially satisﬁed. Thus we can restrict attention to
the remaining cases. Suppose through the end of the proof that RL is not unan-
imous. This in turn implies that both (Ri, RL) and (R
′
i, RL) are not unanimous.
Therefore {ω, ω′, χ} ⊆ {cs, cs+2} . Observe that we have ω = Πcs (Ri, RL) and
ω′ = Πcs (R
′
i, RL). By population-monotonicity of Πcs , we have χ RL ω and χ
RL ω
′. Two cases arise. First, if χ ∈ {ω, ω′} , then we have either ω RL ω′ or
ω RL ω
′. Therefore, in this case, the axiom is satisﬁed. Second, if χ /∈ {ω, ω′} ,
since {ω, ω′, χ} ⊆ {cs, cs+2} , then necessarily ω = ω′, and the axiom is trivially
satisﬁed. This end the proof.
If Φ satisﬁes the conditions of Pareto-eﬃciency and replacement-domination
then Φ is Pareto-equivalent to a solution in {Φ0, . . . ,Φ3}. Let Φ be a solution
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on RN4 that satisﬁes these two conditions. By Theorem 2, there exist a so-
lution Π on U4 that coincides with Φ on RN4 and satisﬁes Pareto-eﬃciency
and population-monotonicity. By (i), there exists x ∈ C such that Π is Pareto-
equivalent to Πx. As before, let s be the unique index in {0, . . . , 3} such that x ∈
[cs, cs+1[. Let us show that x = cs. Consider proﬁles (R
s+1, Rs+2, Rs+3, ..., Rs+3)
and (Rs, Rs+2, Rs+3, ..., Rs+3), both in RN4 . By (i), we know that the equali-
ties Φ (Rs+1, Rs+2, Rs+3, ..., Rs+3) = σs+1 (x) and Φ (R
s, Rs+2, Rs+3, ..., Rs+3) =
σs (x) hold. Since x ∈ [cs, cs+1[, therefore σs+1 (x) ∈ ]cs+1, cs+2] and σs (x) ∈
]cs+3, cs] . Therefore σs+1 (x) P
s+2 σs (x) , and replacement-domination requires
that σs+1 (x) R
s+3 σs (x) , which in turn implies x = cs. Therefore Φ is Pareto-
equivalent to the restriction of Πcs to RN4 , which is Φs.
4.4.4 The case v = 5
When v = 5, the solutions satisfying the conditions of Pareto-eﬃciency and
population-monotonicity form a ﬁve-dimensional family of eﬃcient priority rules.
The solutions that satisfy Pareto-eﬃciency and replacement-domination form
a one-dimensional family of eﬃcient priority rules. As in previous cases, the
family of priorities characterizing the second problem is a subset of the family
of priorities characterizing the ﬁrst problem.
Let us introduce these families. A solution in the ﬁrst family is identiﬁed
with a parameter λ = (x, a, b, d, e) from a certain subset of C5, which we describe
next. For all index t ∈ {0, ..., 4} , deﬁne the following sets of such vectors.
Let ΛtA be the set of vectors λ in C5 such that x ∈ [ct+2, ct−2], a ∈ ]ct+1, ct+2] ,
b ∈ [ct−2, ct−1[ , d ∈ [ct−1, ct+1] , b Rt−2 x, a Rt+2 x, d Rt−1,t+1 x, e Rt d, and in
addition, the relations d Rt−1 b and e Rt+1 a hold.
Let ΛtB be the set of vectors λ in C5 such that x ∈ [ct+2, ct−2], a ∈ ]ct+1, ct+2] ,
b ∈ [ct−2, ct−1[ , d ∈ [ct−1, ct+1] , b Rt−2 x, a Rt+2 x, d Rt−1,t+1 x, e Rt d, and in
addition, the relations d Rt+1 a and e Rt−1 b hold.
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Let Λ := ∪t=0,...,4 (ΛtA ∪ ΛtB) and Λ∩ := ∪t=0,...,4 (ΛtA ∩ ΛtB) . Equivalently, a
vector λ is in Λ∩ if there is an index t satisfying x ∈ [ct+2, ct−2] , a = ct+2,
b = ct−2 and d = e = ct. Observe that for all λ ∈ Λ, the index t is uniquely
deﬁned, in the sense that t = t′ ⇒ (ΛtA ∪ ΛtB) ∩
(
Λt
′
A ∪ Λt′B
)
= ∅.
For all λ ∈ Λ, let λ such that x λ a λ d, x λ b λ d and d λ e λ u
for all u such that u ∈ C\ {x, a, b, d, e} . Let Πλ (RM) be the eﬃcient priority
rule on U5, and let Φλ (RM) be the eﬃcient priority rule on RN5 associated with
the priority λ.
For example, let λ = (x, a, b, d, e) ∈ Λ (see Figure 3a). The rule Πλ selects
a location as follows. Let RM be any proﬁle in U5. If x belongs to E (RM) ,
then the rule selects x. In the opposite case, at most one location among a and
b belongs to E (RM) . If one among these two locations does and x does not,
then the rule selects this location. If neither x, a nor b belong to E (RM) , but
d does, then the rule selects the location d. If neither x, a, b, nor d belong to
E (RM) , but e does, then the rule selects the location e. Finally, if none of these
ﬁve locations belong to E (RM) , then RM must be a unanimous proﬁle. In this
case, the rule Πλ selects the location commonly preferred by all agents in proﬁle
RM .
Theorem 5 (i) A solution on U5 satisﬁes Pareto-eﬃciency and population
monotonicity iﬀ it is in {Πλ}λ∈Λ . (ii) A solution onRN5 satisﬁes Pareto-eﬃciency
and replacement-domination iﬀ it is in {Φλ}λ∈Λ∩ .
Proof of (i) . Πλ is well deﬁned. Let λ ∈ Λ and RM ∈ U5. Let us prove that
Πλ (RM) is well-deﬁned. Condition (1) is clearly satisﬁed for all λ in this set.
Let us show that condition (2) is also always satisﬁed. This is trivially the case
if E (RM) is a singleton. Suppose not. Then the deﬁnition of Λ ensures that
E (RM) contains at least one of the locations x, a, b, d or e, which all have a
higher priority than all remaining locations in C. All pairs of locations among
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Figure 3: An illustration of the components of the parameter set Λ
when v = 5. (a) A vector λ = (x, a, b, d, e) in Λ4A. (b) A vector
λ = (x, a, b, d, e) in Λ4B.
these ﬁve locations distinct from the pair (a, b) are comparable. Thus for these
pairs, conditions (2) holds. We also have a, b ∈ E (RM) ⇒ x ∈ E (RM), x λ a
and x λ b. Therefore condition (2) holds for the pair (a, b) as well. Therefore
Πλ is well-deﬁned.
Πλ satisﬁes population-monotonicity. We let the reader verify that for all
λ ∈ Λ, we have a Rt,t+1,t+2 x, b Rt−2,t−1,t x, d Rt−1,t,t+1 x and e Rt−1,t,t+1 x.
In addition, if λ ∈ ΛA, then e Rt,t+1 a, d Rt−1,t b and e Rt,t+1 d. Similarly, if
λ ∈ ΛB, then d Rt,t+1 a, e Rt−1,t b and e Rt−1,t d. All these relations can be
easily derived from the deﬁnitions. Let λ ∈ Λ, RM ∈ U5 and R′i ∈ R5. Let χ :=
Πλ (RM) and ω := Πλ (R
′
i, RM) . We will show that population-monotonicity is
satisﬁed, i.e. χ RM ω. First, if RM is a unanimous proﬁle, the axiom is trivially
satisﬁed. Suppose through the end of the proof that RM is not unanimous. As
a consequence, (R′i, RM) is not unanimous either. Therefore both χ and ω are
elements of {x, a, b, d, e} . Second, if χ = ω, again the axiom is trivially satisﬁed.
Suppose through the end of the proof that χ = ω. Since E (RM) ⊂ E (R′i, RM) ,
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we have ω λ χ. Since x, a, b, d λ e, it follows that ω ∈ {x, a, b, d} . Let us
examine each case. I) Suppose that ω = x, so that χ ∈ {a, b, d, e} . If χ = a, then
S (RM) ⊆ {Rt, Rt+1, Rt+2} . Similarly, if χ = b, then S (RM) ⊆ {Rt−2, Rt−1, Rt} .
Finally, if χ ∈ {d, e} , then S (RM) ⊆ {Rt−1, Rt, Rt+1} . In the ﬁrst case, we have
a Rt,t+1,t+2 x. In the second case, we have b Rt−2,t−1,t x. In the third case, we
have d Rt−1,t,t+1 x and e Rt−1,t,t+1 x. In all three cases, the axiom is therefore
satisﬁed. II) Suppose that ω = a. This implies that S (RM) = {Rt, Rt+1} .
Moreover, either (χ = e and λ ∈ ΛA), or (χ = d and λ ∈ ΛB). In both cases,
we have χ Rt,t+1 a, i.e. the axiom is satisﬁed. III) Suppose that ω = b. This
implies that S (RM) = {Rt−1, Rt} . Moreover, either (χ = d and λ ∈ ΛA), or
(χ = e and λ ∈ ΛB). In both cases, we have χ Rt−1,t a, i.e. the axiom is
satisﬁed. IV) Suppose that ω = d, which in turn implies χ = e. Then either
(S (RM) = {Rt, Rt+1} and λ ∈ ΛA) or (S (RM) = {Rt−1, Rt} and λ ∈ ΛB). In
the ﬁrst case, we have e Rt,t+1 d. In the second case, we have e Rt−1,t d. The
axiom is therefore satisﬁed in both cases, which ends the proof.
If Π satisﬁes Pareto-eﬃciency and population-monotonicity, then Π = Πλ
for some λ ∈ Λ.
Let Π be a solution on U5 satisfying these two conditions. Throughout the
proof, for all population M , let θM := Π (R
∗5
M).
Step 1: Choice of a candidate vector λ ∈ Λ.
Let x := θ{0,...,4}. Let t′ be the unique index in {0, ..., 4} such that x ∈
]ct+2, ct−2] . Let a′ := θ{t′,t′+1,t′+2}, b′ := θ{t′−2,t′−1,t′}, d′ := θ{t′−1,...,t′+1}. By
Pareto-eﬃciency, we have a′ ∈ [ct′ , ct′+2] , b′ ∈ [ct′−2, ct′ ] , d′ ∈ [ct′−1, ct′+1] . By
population-monotonicity+, we have a
′ Rt
′+2 x and b′ Rt
′−2 x, which further
implies a′ ∈ [ct′+1, ct′+2] and b′ ∈ [ct′−2, ct′−1[ . By population-monotonicity+, we
have d′ Rt
′+1 x, and d′ Rt
′−1 x. To deﬁne the last location e′, we distinguish two
cases A and B, which exhaust all possibilities, since d′ ∈ [ct′−1, ct′+1]. Case A:
If d′ ∈ [ct′−1, ct′ ], let e′ := θ{t′,t′+1}. Case B: If d′ ∈ [ct′ , ct′+1] , let e′ := θ{t′−1,t′}.
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If d′ = ct′ , by Lemma 3, these two deﬁnitions of e′ coincide in e′ = ct′ , thus e′ is
well-deﬁned.
In Case A, population-monotonicity+ implies d
′ Rt
′−1 b′, e′ Rt
′+1 a′, and e′
Rt
′
d′. In Case B, it implies d′ Rt
′+1 b′, e′ Rt
′−1 a′, and e′ Rt
′
d′. The vector
λ := (x, a′, b′, d′, e′) satisﬁes all the conditions of either the set ΛA (in Case A)
or the set ΛB (in Case B), except perhaps the condition a
′ = ct′+1.
Let t′′ be the unique index in {0, ..., 4} such that x ∈ [ct+2, ct−2[ . Observe
that either t′′ = t′ or t′′ = t′ + 1. Deﬁne a′′, b′′, d′′, e′′ and λ′′, in a similar
fashion as a′, b′, d′ and e′. Again, the vector λ := (x, a′, b′, d′, e′) satisﬁes all the
conditions of either ΛA or ΛB, except perhaps the condition b
′′ = ct′−1. We now
prove that either a′ = ct′+1 or b′′ = ct′′−1 holds, which will ensure that either λ′
or λ′′ is an element of Λ.
First, if the prime variables coincide with the double prime variables, we
have x ∈ ]ct′+2, ct′−2[ . This, a′ Rt′+2 x and b′ Rt′−2 x, imply that (a′ = ct′+1 and
b′ = ct′−1). Suppose that they diﬀer. By deﬁnition, we have t′′ = t′ + 1, and
b′′ = d′. Suppose for example that a′ = ct′+1. Then a′ Rt
′+2 x implies x = ct′−2.
Then b′ Rt
′−2 x implies b′ = ct′−2. Then d′ Rt
′−1 x and d′ ∈ [ct′−1, ct′+1] implies
d′ ∈ [ct′−1, ct′ ] . Therefore Case A holds, i.e. e′ ∈ [ct′ , ct′+1] . Then e′ Rt′+1 a′
implies e′ = a′. Then e′ Rt
′
d′ implies d′ = ct′−1. Therefore b′′ = ct′−1 = ct′′−2 =
ct′′−1. Therefore either λ′ or λ′′ is an element of Λ. Let λ ∈ {λ′, λ′′} ∩ Λ.
Step 2: We have Π = Πλ, with λ ∈ Λ deﬁned as in Step 1.
By Pareto-eﬃciency, Π and Πλ obviously coincide on all unanimous proﬁles.
Let RM be any non-unanimous proﬁle in U5. Suppose ﬁrst that x ∈ E (RM) .
By Lemma 3, we have Π (RM) = x = Πλ (RM) . Suppose instead that x /∈
E (RM) and b ∈ E (RM) . Since b ∈ [ct−2, ct−1[ , then either E (RM) = [ct−2, ct]
or E (RM) = [ct−2, ct−1] . In both cases, E (RM) ⊆ E
(
R{t−2,t−1,t}
)
. Thus by
Lemma 3, we have Π (RM) = b = Πλ (RM) . Suppose instead that x /∈ E (RM)
and a ∈ E (RM) . By a symmetric argument, we have Π (RM) = a = Πλ (RM) .
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Suppose instead that x, a, b /∈ E (RM) , and d ∈ E (RM) . Then either E (RM) =
[ct−1, ct+1] , E (RM) = [ct−1, ct] or E (RM) = [ct, ct+1] . In all cases, E (RM) ⊆
E
(
R{t−1,t,t+1}
)
. Thus by Lemma 3, we have Π (RM) = d = Πλ (RM) . Sup-
pose instead that x, a, b, d /∈ E (RM) and e ∈ E (RM) . Suppose further that
λ ∈ ΛA. Then E (RM) = [ct, ct+1] = E
(
R{t,t+1}
)
. Then by Lemma 3, we
have Π (RM) = θ{t,t+1} = e = Πλ (RM) . Suppose instead that λ ∈ ΛB. Then
E (RM) = [ct−1, ct] = E
(
R{t−1,t}
)
. Then by Lemma 3, we have Π (RM) =
θ{t−1,t} = e = Πλ (RM) . In conclusion, we proved that Π = Πλ.
Proof of (ii) . Φλ is well deﬁned. We already proved thatλ satisﬁes conditions
(1) and (2) , for all λ ∈ Λ, in particular for all λ ∈ Λ∩.
Φλ satisﬁes replacement-domination. Let λ ∈ Λ∩, i ∈ N , L := N\ {i} ,
RL ∈ RL5 and Ri, R′i ∈ R5. Let ω := Φλ (Ri, RL) and ω′ := Φλ (R′i, RL) . We
will show that replacement-domination is satisﬁed, i.e. either ω RL ω
′, or ω′ RL
ω. Observe that we also have ω = Πλ (Ri, RL) and ω
′ = Πλ (R′i, RL) and that
Πλ satisﬁes population-monotonicity. Let χ := Πλ (RL) . First, by population-
monotonicity, we have χ RL ω and χ RL ω
′. Therefore if χ ∈ {ω, ω′} , the axiom
is satisﬁed. Suppose through the end of the proof that χ /∈ {ω, ω′}. Since
E (RL) ⊂ E (Ri, RL) , we have ω λ χ. For similar reasons, we have ω′ λ χ.
Second, if ω = ω′, the axiom is trivially satisﬁed. Suppose through the end
of the proof that ω = ω′. Third, if RL is a unanimous proﬁle, the axiom is
trivially satisﬁed. Suppose through the end of the proof that this is not the
case, which also implies that (Ri, RL) and (R
′
i, RL) are not unanimous either.
To summarize, our suppositions are that ω, ω′ and χ are distinct locations in
{x, ct−2, ct, ct+2} , such that ω λ χ and ω′ λ χ. Since ω = ω′, at least one of
these two locations is distinct from x. Without loss of generality, suppose for
example that ω = x. Since we also have ω  χ, then ω ∈ {ct−2, ct+2}. Without
loss of generality, suppose for example that ω = ct+2. Then ω = χ implies that
S (RL) = {Rt, Rt+1} and χ = ct. This in turn implies that ω′ = ct−2. Since we
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also have ω′ = ω, χ, then necessarily ω′ = x. Since we have ct+2 Rt,t+1 x, the
axiom is satisﬁed, which ends the proof.
If Φ satisﬁes Pareto-eﬃciency and replacement-domination, then Φ = Φλ
for some λ ∈ Λ∩.
Let Φ be a solution on RN5 satisfying these two conditions. By Theorem 2, Φ
can be extended into a solution on U5 that satisﬁes population-monotonicity.
Therefore either there exists λ = (x, a, b, d, e) ∈ Λ such that Πλ coincides with
Φ, which in turn implies Φ = Φλ. We prove that λ ∈ Λ∩. Suppose by con-
tradiction that λ /∈ ΛA. Consider RN := (Rt+1, Rt−1, Rt, ..., Rt) ∈ RN5 and
R′N := (R
t−2, Rt−1, Rt, ..., Rt) ∈ RN5 . We have Φ (RN) = d ∈ ]ct, ct+1] and
Φ (R′N) = b ∈ [ct−2, ct−1[ . But this violates replacement-domination for pref-
erences Rt−1 and Rt, a contradiction. Therefore λ ∈ ΛA. A similar reasoning
proves λ ∈ ΛB. In conclusion Φ = Φλ, for some λ ∈ Λ∩.
4.5 A negative result
Unfortunately, the existence results obtained for polygons of order 3, 4 and 5
do not extend to larger polygons. When v ≥ 6, no solution on Uv satisﬁes
Pareto-eﬃciency and population-monotonicity. A fortiori, no solution on RNv
satisﬁes Pareto-eﬃciency and replacement-domination.
Theorem 6 Let v ≥ 6. No solution on Uv satisﬁes Pareto-eﬃciency and pop-
ulation monotonicity. No solution on RNv satisﬁes the conditions of Pareto-
eﬃciency and replacement-domination.
Proof. Let η := v/2 . Suppose, by contradiction, that Π is a solution on Uv
satisfying Pareto-eﬃciency and population-monotonicity. For all population M ,
let θM := Π (R
∗v
M) . Let s be the unique integer such that θ{0,...,v−1} ∈ [cs, cs+1[ .
For simplicity and without loss of generality, assume that s = 0, so that
θ{0,...,v−1} ∈ [c0, c1[ . By population-monotonicity+, we have θ{2,...,2+η} R2,2+η
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θ{0,...,v−1}, and by Pareto-eﬃciency, θ{2,...,2+η} ∈ [c2, c2+η] . Thus θ{2,...,2+η} ∈
]c2, c4] . By population-monotonicity+, we have θ{3,4,5} R3 θ{2,...,2+η}, and by
Pareto-eﬃciency , θ{3,4,5} ∈ [c3, c5] . Therefore θ{3,4,5} ∈ [c3, c4] . By population-
monotonicity+, we have θ{3,...,3+η} R3,3+η θ{0,...,v−1}, and by Pareto-eﬃciency,
θ{3,...,3+η} ∈ [c3, c3+η] . Thus θ{3,...,3+η} ∈ ]c4, c6] . By population-monotonicity+,
we have θ{3,4,5} R5 θ{3,...,3+η}, and by Pareto-eﬃciency, θ{3,4,5} ∈ [c3, c5] . Thus
θ{3,4,5} ∈ [c4, c5] . Since θ{3,4,5} ∈ [c4, c5] and θ{3,4,5} ∈ [c3, c4] , we have θ{3,4,5} =
c4. Since c4 = θ{3,4,5} R3 θ{2,...,2+η} and θ{2,...,2+η} ∈ ]c2, c4] , we have θ{2,...,2+η} =
c4. By population-monotonicity+, we have θ{2,3,4} R4 θ{2,...,2+η} = c4. Thus
θ{2,3,4} = c4. By population-monotonicity+, we have c4 = θ{2,3,4} R2 θ{1,...,4}
and by Pareto-eﬃciency, θ{1,...,4} ∈ [c1, c4] . Thus θ{1,...,4} = c4. By population-
monotonicity+, we have c4 = θ{1,...,4} R1 θ{0,...,v−1}. But this result contradicts
θ{0,...,v−1} ∈ [c0, c1[ . Therefore no solution on Uv satisﬁes Pareto-eﬃciency and
population-monotonicity. A fortiori by Theorem 2, no solution on RNv satisﬁes
Pareto-eﬃciency and replacement-domination.
This result implies Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that Π (respec-
tively Φ) is a solution on U (respectively on RN) satisfying Pareto-eﬃciency
and population-monotonicity (respectively replacement-domination). Consider
the restriction Π′ of Π (respectively Φ′ of Φ) to U6 (respectively to RN6 ). Then
Π′ (respectively Φ′) satisﬁes Pareto-eﬃciency and population-monotonicity (re-
spectively replacement-domination), in contradiction with Theorem 6.
All results on population-monotonicity in the paper were established under
the assumption that N is countably inﬁnite. This assumption is convenient in
the proofs, but not essential. As long as N contains at least four agents, the
results on population-monotonicity are not aﬀected. Proving this requires inter-
mediate results on population-monotonicity in the spirit of Lemma 4 and Theo-
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rem 2, and long but not diﬃcult proofs. All results on replacement-domination
in the paper were established for a ﬁxed population containing at least four
agents. For both problems, the case of 3 agents is an open question.
5 Conclusion
We have shown that Pareto-eﬃciency and solidarity are incompatible in suﬃ-
ciently rich cyclically single-peaked domains, and have characterized the solu-
tions satisfying these properties for smaller polygon-structured domains. The
solutions we characterized have the interesting property that each of them
maximizes a certain weak partial order on the Pareto-set. Interestingly, the
solutions we obtained also satisfy various appealing conditions, which we did
not require. The solutions are all strategy-proof, and even coalition-strategy-
proof, i.e. no coalition of agents can obtain a strict Pareto-improvement for
all of its members by misreporting their preferences. The solutions are also
essentially anonymous, i.e. each of them does not depend on agents’ labels
up to Pareto-indiﬀerence8. An interesting question concerns solutions satisfy-
ing Pareto-eﬃciency, anonymity, and strategy-proofness (or coalition-strategy-
proofness) in smaller polygon-structured domains. In particular, how small does
such a domain need to be, for these conditions to be compatible? Our results
shows that the threshold polygon order for this problem is equal or larger than
5. How large are the corresponding sets of solutions?
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